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Galvanising shareholder activism: a prerequisite for effective corporate 
governance and accountability in Nigeria 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Shareholder activism has been largely neglected in the few available studies 
on corporate governance in sub Saharan Africa. Following the recent 
challenges posed by the Cadbury Nigeria Plc, this paper examines 
shareholder activism in an evolving corporate governance institutional context 
and identifies strategic opportunities associated with shareholders‟ 
empowerment through changes in code of corporate governance and recent 
developments in information and communications technologies in Nigeria; 
especially in relation to corporate social responsibility in Nigeria. It is expected 
that the paper would contribute to the scarce literature on corporate 
governance and accountability in Africa.   
 
Keywords: Business law; Corporate governance; Corporate accountability; 
Shareholder empowerment and activism; Nigeria 
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Introduction 
 
Publicly quoted companies in Nigeria are gradually – albeit very slowly – 
attuning to principles of good corporate governance. In recognition, Nigeria 
was recently rated average in the World Bank investor protection index, which 
covers transparency of transactions, liability for self-dealing, shareholders 
ability to seek redress against officers and directors.1 However, the current 
Cadbury Nigeria Plc (a subsidiary of Cadbury Schweppes) financial 
accounting saga (see appendix for details) ushers in a new dawn in corporate 
governance and accountability in Nigeria which challenges shareholders‟ 
ability to hold management to account through activism – a way by which 
shareholders can influence a corporation‟s behaviour by exercising their rights 
as owners.2  
 
Shareholder activism is not a new phenomenon in developed market 
economies. O‟Rourke did an historical analysis of shareholders activism which 
dates back to some sixty years in the U.S. She noted the 1946 landmark 
requirement under US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule, 
which requires companies to include shareholder resolutions in proxy 
statements. This has remained the rule till date. The 60‟s and 70‟s witnessed 
the use of shareholder proxy to pressure companies in more areas such as 
product safety, environmental pollution and employment discrimination. In the 
                                                 
1 See http://www.doingbusiness.org ‚The indexes vary between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating 
greater disclosure, greater liability of directors, greater powers of shareholders to challenge the 
transaction, and better investor protection‛. Nigeria scored 5 on the scale while the OECD average is 6 
2 It is instructive to note that the irregularities in the Cadbury case was discovered after the parent 
company, Cadbury Schweppes, increased its stake in the company from 46% to 50%. This development 
questions the ability of shareholders in Nigeria to act effectively within the corporate governance 
framework in the country.  
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80‟s shareholder activism shifted to anti takeover activities, which according to 
O‟Rourke may partly be due to a swing away from public interest movement 
towards making companies more competitive. However, the call for social and 
environmental responsibility emerged again in the 1990‟s with increased 
involvement of shareholder activities. According to her, shareholder activist 
groups in the US include individual shareholders, Non governmental 
Organizations, Churches and religious groups, mutual and pension funds and 
other umbrella groups. 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore how recent developments in Nigeria 
contribute to shareholders activism and how to improve participation of 
shareholders in corporate governance – the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities and responsibilities among different actors involved in the 
corporate organization (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The extant literature on 
corporate governance and accountability tends to take shareholder power and 
influence to enforce their rights as a given, and from this point of view often 
argue for stakeholder influence and empowerment, instead. This paper offers 
a contrary perspective wherein shareholders power and influence is not as 
powerful as often assumed and presented in the extant literature. A fair 
treatment of shareholders and their ability to have their voice heard is one of 
the major issues at the core of best corporate governance practice (McNeil, 
2005). It is the position of this paper, therefore, that in order to increase 
participation in the financial market, in an economy such as Nigeria, it would 
be necessary to gain shareholders‟ confidence, by demonstrating that their 
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companies are being run and managed efficiently, and that they have a real 
role to play in the company. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, it would be necessary to make a distinction 
between universal share ownership and universal owners (Turnbull, 1993). 
According to Turnbull „a “universal owner” is an institution which effectively 
owns a small portion of the economy‟, while universal share ownership 
presumes direct ownership by individual stakeholders. Universal ownership 
has two important drawbacks, which were identified by Turnbull. In the first 
place they may seek to maximize profits by externalizing social costs to 
taxpayers whom they represent. Secondly, it also raises the problem of the 
same owners being involved in the governance of competing firms. As noted 
by Maassen and Brown (2006), the composition of institutional (universal 
owners) investors varies widely and consequently affects their voting 
disposition. They further noted that while institutional shareholders are 
capable of influencing corporate behaviour, their effectiveness is widely 
debated in the literature. It was noted that institutional investors, such as 
mutual funds, have tended to align with management and have been passive 
while institutional investors, such as public pension schemes, appear to be 
more pro-active (Maassen and Brown, 2006:224). Studies have also found 
that there are weak links between institutional shareholding and firm 
performance, while the prospects of misdirection of shareholder activism also 
affect firm effectiveness (Maassen and Brown, 2006: 244/245). Universal 
share ownership, in the contrary, avoids the problems of universal owner by 
increasing participation of other stakeholders, such as employees, ensuring 
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that same owners do not participate in the governing of competing firms and 
that institutional holding is not run in a way that transfers the costs of 
externalities to people who may be the shareholders they are representing 
(Turnbull, 1997). The shareholder activism advocated in this paper primarily 
relates to universal share ownership. 
 
Following ongoing corporate governance reforms and recent developments in 
information and communication technologies in Nigeria, this paper examines 
the possible effects of these on shareholder democracy – by exploring the 
viability of mobilizing individual shareholders (i.e. universal share owners) in 
order to make them real actors in corporate governance and accountability in 
Nigeria. Aguilera and Cuervo –Cazurra (2004) suggested that there are at 
least two possible ways of achieving this aim: one is for a country to reinvent 
its legal systems and the other is for a country to introduce new corporate 
governance practices into existing corporate governance systems. The paper 
argues that because of the peculiarity of the Nigerian situation, a combination 
of both approaches would be needed. The paper concludes that shareholders 
of Nigerian firms have the potential to positively influence corporate behaviour 
only if they are able to exercise meaningful control over management.  
 
Shareholding practice and structure in Nigeria: overview and challenges 
 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) has been in existence for about 46 
years. According to the NSE, it has over 260 listed securities including 10 
Government Stock, 55 industrial loans (Debenture/Preferences) stocks and 
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195 equity/ordinary shares of companies with a total capitalization of about 
875.2 billion naira.3 Shareholding in Nigeria has grown from a few thousands 
in the early 70s to an estimated 10 million. The privatization programme in 
Nigeria has had tremendous impact on share ownership. According to Tanko 
II, (2004) in the first phase of the programme, privatized companies offered 
over 1.3 billion shares for sale to the public. Over 800,000 shareholders, many 
of them first time buyers, purchased the shares. Between 1989 and 2005, 
forty government-owned companies were privatized.   
 
The early companies in Nigeria were British based. By virtue of Colonial 
statutes enacted between 1876 and 1922, the law applicable to companies in 
Nigeria at this time was the „common law, the doctrines of equity, and the 
statutes of general application in England on the first day of January, 1900‟ 
subject to any later relevant statute. The implication of this approach was that 
the common law concepts such as the concept of the separate and 
independent legal personality of companies as enunciated in Salomon v. 
Salomon was received into the Nigeria Company law and has since remained 
part of the law (Orojo, 1992:17). However with continued growth of trade, the 
colonialist felt it was necessary to promulgate laws to facilitate business 
activities locally. The first company law in Nigeria was the Companies 
Ordinance of 1912, which was a local enactment of the Companies 
(Consolidation) Act 1908 of England; and even the current company law of 
Nigeria (now known as the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 - CAMA) 
is largely modelled on the U.K Company Act, 1948 (Guobadia, 2000).  
                                                 
3 NSE information till 2003; see website 
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Under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) (the principal legislation 
on company law in Nigeria) there are three organs of the company the general 
meeting, the board of directors and the managing director (to the extent that 
the board of directors delegate their power to the office).4 The two principal 
organs are the board of directors and the general meeting. The general 
meeting is the shareholders acting in properly convened meetings. The 
powers of the two principal organs are set out in the articles of association of 
a company.5  The board of directors are given the exclusive powers to 
manage a company in accordance with the provisions of the Articles of 
Association of the company and are not bound to obey the directives of the 
general meeting (shareholders) when acting in accordance with powers 
conferred by the articles of association and CAMA. However there are powers 
conferred on the shareholders under CAMA, which makes them, theoretically, 
potential effective force in corporate governance. These include default 
powers to act in any matter if the members of the board of directors are 
unable to act (because of a deadlock et cetera) or are disqualified from acting 
in that respect; instituting legal proceeding in the name of or on behalf of the 
company, where the board of directors refuse or neglect to do so; they also 
have power to ratify or confirm actions taken by directors and to make 
recommendations to the board of directors regarding actions to be taken by 
the board of directors. Furthermore the shareholders acting in the general 
meeting have the power over the appointment and removal of directors and 
also to amend the articles of association to alter the powers of directors. 
                                                 
4 S. 64 CAMA 
5  S 63 (2) CAMA 
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There are usually two types of meetings under CAMA, the annual general 
meeting and the extraordinary general meeting. Every company is expected to 
hold an Annual General Meeting (AGM) every year. Any member or members 
holding not less than one-tenth of the shares of the company at the date the 
requisition is made may request for the holding of an extraordinary meeting. 
The Annual General Meeting is the strongest forum for exerting shareholders 
influence in the Nigerian Corporate Governance schema. There are usually 
many important issues of corporate governance, which need the assent of the 
shareholders at such meetings. For instance, the directors are required to 
prepare and place before the shareholders at the AGM the financial statement 
prepared in accordance with CAMA. The shareholders must have the 
statements delivered to them at least 21 days before the AGM. The 
shareholders have the prerogative to either approve or reject the statement. 
Secondly, the AGM has the power to appoint and remove auditors of the 
company. An auditor is required to report to the shareholders on all the 
account records and financial statements of the company. An audit committee 
comprising of equal number of directors and representatives of shareholders 
is required to examine the auditors report and make recommendation to the 
AGM. 
 
To facilitate adequate participation of shareholders, it is required under the 
law that a minimum notice of 21 days must be given to all persons entitled to 
receive notice of the general meeting. A notice is however, deemed to be 
properly given if properly addressed and posted. It is required that every 
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public company advertises the notice in at least two daily newspapers 21 days 
before the meeting. However, given the weakness of the Nigerian postal 
system and the low readership of newspapers in Nigeria the possibility of not 
receiving adequate notice is high. 
 
Effective exercise of shareholder‟s powers requires that as many 
shareholders as possible participate in the voting process.6 Only shareholders 
are entitled to vote on resolutions at general meetings. Where voting is done 
by a show of hands every member or proxy has one vote. Where voting is 
done by a poll, a member‟s voting power will depend on his or her 
shareholding. A member is entitled to appoint another person including a 
person who is not a member to attend, vote and speak on his behalf. 
However, the usual practice in Nigeria is that directors send out proxy papers 
by which they expressly put themselves forward to be nominated as proxies. 
This practice according to Orojo (1992:290) inevitably strengthens the position 
of the directors at general meetings where a sizeable number of proxy papers 
are returned. 
 
The CAMA allows a shareholder or group of shareholders to propose a 
resolution or make a statement for the consideration of a general meeting. 
The shareholder(s) making such a proposal must be member(s) representing 
not less than one twentieth, i.e. 5% of the total voting rights of all the members 
having at the date of the proposal a right to vote at the meeting or by one 
hundred or more members holding shares in the company which has been 
                                                 
6 European Commission ‘Fostering an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders’ Rights: Second 
Consultation by the Services of the Internal Market Directorate General’ MARKT/13.05.2005 
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paid up to an average sum of N500 (i.e. £2) per member. Thus shareholders 
may influence the direction a company takes via the use of shareholders‟ 
resolution. However it has been observed that „most Annual General Meetings 
in Nigeria are fraught with corruption. They are arranged in such a way that 
once the leaders of the shareholders association are bribed in one way or the 
other shareholders only go to the event to sing the praises of management for 
a robust account, instead of actually asking accountants to look more closely 
into the accounts and raising pertinent questions (Gabriel, 2006). 
 
The law makes some provisions for access to the court for redress for minority 
shareholders. This covers actions brought by an aggrieved shareholder for 
wrongs done to him personally or to take a derivative action in the name of the 
company. Furthermore sections 310-312 of the CAMA allows a shareholder to 
bring an action on the ground of unfairly prejudicial and oppressive conduct 
with the court having a wide range of relief to chose from. However, despite 
the legal provisions, there are many obstacles, which have discouraged a 
coordinated shareholder activism in Nigeria. There are practical problems 
such as inadequacy of notices of statutory meetings, inaccessible venue of 
meetings and inappropriate conducts of meetings. Other problems include 
lack of information, apathy on the path of shareholders and a weak judicial 
system.  
 
According to Nmehielle and Nwachue (2004), Nigeria is not characterised by 
one typology of company. Based on an historical analysis of shareholding 
structure in Nigeria, they concluded that shareholding in Nigeria is generally 
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diffused with few exceptions to the general rule leading to the classic Berle 
and Means (1932) model on the separation of ownership from control. 
Nmehielle and Nwachue traced the diffusion of shareholding back to the 
indigenisation programme of the government in the 70‟s. Under the 
programme, Nigerians bought into companies erstwhile owned by foreigners. 
However while the Nigerian shareholding was fragmented, the foreign 
shareholding was intact, making foreign shareholders dominant partners. In 
this regard, although local shareholders in many instances might be owners of 
a company because of cumulative larger shareholding, foreigners remained in 
control, especially because of the weighted voting share scheme which gave 
more votes to foreign shareholders. This shareholding structure persisted 
even after the indigenisation scheme and the weighted voting scheme were 
abolished. Nmehielle and Nwachue further pointed out that by the listing 
requirement of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, public companies on the First 
Tier Securities Market are required to have at least 300 shareholders while 
those on the Second Tier Securities Market are required to have at least 150 
shareholders thus further fragmenting the shareholding structure in Nigeria.7 
 
The privatisation and commercialisation programme in Nigeria to some extent 
also contributed to the fragmented share ownership in Nigeria as the enabling 
statute prohibited the acquisition of more than 0.1% especially where the 
shares are oversubscribed.8 The exceptions to this general trend are private 
firms and foreign and local institutional shareholding (which are few) (Limbs 
                                                 
7 Under the listing rules of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the securities market is divided into tiers 
depending on the companies’ capacity. See Nigerian Stock Exchange Fact Book, 2003. 
8 Section 5(4) of the Privatisation and Commercialisation Act, 1999 
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and Fort, 2000; Oyejide and Soyibo, 2001). Furthermore, as Nmehielle and 
Nwachue (2004) pointed out, the shift by the body charged with the 
privatisation programme in Nigeria which actively sought core strategic 
investors holding 51% or more shares in some privatised companies has led 
to dominant shareholding in such firms. In a similar trend, Tanko (2004) 
observed that Nigerian investors are so dispersed and the individual holdings 
generally small that they have no means of exerting any influence on the 
management of companies post privatisation. According to Maassen and 
Brown (2006), „with widely dispersed share ownership, minimum standards for 
formal communication and disclosure must be regulated through corporate 
law and self-regulation such as voluntary corporate governance codes‟. They 
importantly noted that „such communication, disclosure, and governance 
mechanisms will be of value only if the shareholders are empowered to act on 
such information.‟ 
 
According to a survey by Oyejide and Soyibo (2001) Nigeria score poorly on 
fair conduct of shareholders‟ meetings when compared to other emerging 
markets in the Middle East and North Africa. The survey covered important 
issues impacting on shareholders right such as the handling of general 
meetings, prohibition of insider dealings, publication of director dealings and 
transactions, adequate notification to shareholders, transparency, judicial 
remedies and access to information. The survey reveals that all shareholders 
do not have equal access to information. In fact 95% of the respondents to the 
survey were of the opinion that there was no meaningful compliance to this 
requirement and that compliance and enforcement is inconsistent. As regards 
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shareholders access to judicial remedies, 70% of respondents feel that there 
is no evidence of any legal/administrative system with respect to shareholders 
rights while 25% was of the opinion that the system does not work. 75% of the 
respondents were of the opinion that there was inconsistent quality of 
information during company meetings in Nigeria. While insider trading is 
effectively prohibited in Nigeria the survey shows compliance/enforcement is 
inconsistent in the country. The recent case of Cadbury Nigeria Plc (see 
appendix) is an eloquent testimony to the shareholding challenges in Nigeria. 
 
Recent changes and developments towards shareholders 
empowerment, activism and strategic corporate governance in Nigeria 
 
According to Aguilera and Cuervo–Cazurra (2004) the processes of 
globalization – such as the liberalization and internationalization of 
economies, developments in telecommunications, and the integration of 
capital markets – and the transformation in the ownership structure of firms – 
due to the growth of institutional investors, privatization and rising shareholder 
activism – have led to increased attention been paid to corporate governance 
as a monitoring and accountability device. These processes have also 
impacted on the Nigerian environment with the ongoing privatisation and 
commercialization programme, the liberalization of the regulatory framework 
for investment and the transformation in the communication sector. Some of 
these changes have important bearing on shareholder activism within the 
local context.  
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Some of the recent reforms towards shareholder empowerment in Nigeria 
include: a new code of corporate governance, formation of shareholder 
associations and the emergence of information and communication 
technologies. Each of these changes and developments would be related to 
the galvanisation of shareholder activism in Nigeria.  
 
The Code of Corporate Governance 
 
Following poor shareholding practices and further marginalization of 
shareholders in corporate democracy in Nigeria, a code of Corporate 
Governance was adopted in 2003 by the Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Corporate Affairs Commission which made a number of 
recommendations to increase the level of shareholders influence in corporate 
decision making process.  Code of corporate governance has been 
recognised as „a set of „best practice‟ recommendations regarding the 
behaviour and structure of a firms board of directors issued to compensate for 
deficiencies in a country‟s corporate governance system regarding the 
protection of shareholders‟ rights‟ (Aguilera and Cuervo –Cazurra, 2004). The 
Nigerian code thus focuses on shareholders unlike similar codes in other 
African countries, which extended their scope to a broader range of 
stakeholders (Rossouw, 2005). A major recommendation of the code is that 
shareholders should work in concert through shareholders associations. 
 
Section 10 (a) of the code provides: 
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„The company or the board should not discourage shareholder 
activism whether by institutional shareholders or by organized 
shareholders' groups. Shareholders with larger holdings 
(institutional and non-institutional) should act and influence the 
standard of corporate governance positively and thereby 
optimize stakeholder value.‟ 
 
Regarding the composition of Board of Directors, the code provides that 
shareholders with less than 20% or more shareholding should have a seat on 
the board. It further provides that a Director representing the interest of 
minority shareholders should be given a seat on the board. The code further 
provides for more regular briefings of shareholders going beyond going 
beyond the half year and yearly reports. 
 
To facilitate and improve the attendance of shareholders at general meetings 
of the company, the code states that venue for general meetings should be 
places that are possible and affordable – cost and distance wise – for a 
majority of shareholders to attend and vote at annual general meetings. The 
code further requires that notice of meeting be given at least 21 days before 
the meeting and all details related to the agenda of a meeting should 
accompany the notice to enable shareholders properly exercise their vote. 
The code envisages that the general meeting should be a forum for 
shareholder participation in the governance of the company. The changes in 
code of corporate governance have contributed to strengthening of 
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shareholders in Nigeria and have begun to yield some fruits (e.g. Cadbury Plc 
case). 
 
Shareholders' Association  
 
The trend in developed economies, which saw the development of block 
voting through shareholder associations as a response to domination by 
principal shareholders,9 is gradually evolving in the Nigerian context. The 
bonding together of shareholders in Nigeria has come both through private 
initiatives and government intervention. In a bid to shore up public 
participation in the ownership of corporation the Nigerian government 
encouraged and facilitated the establishment of a network of Shareholder 
Associations. Seven Zonal associations were established in 1992. The 
country was divided into seven zones and zonal headquarters were located in 
seven major cities, which are Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Ibadan, Lagos, Onitsha and 
Port Harcourt, respectively. Each of the Zonal Associations is registered with 
the Corporate Affairs Commission; the government department charged with 
the regulation of formation and management of companies the country.10 The 
associations adopted a draft constitution provided by a government 
department, the Bureau of Public Enterprises. The Government also ensures 
that publicly quoted companies allocate seats to the associations on the board 
of corporations. Each of the zones has a board of Trustees, which is elected 
to hold office for life. There is also provision for an executive council charged 
                                                 
9 ‘Improving the Exercise of Shareholder Voting Rights at General Meetings in France’ Report of 
Working Group of the Authourite des Marches Financiers (AMF) – France Securities Regulator chaired 
by Yves Mansion, September, 2005 
10 It also registers Business Names and Incorporated Trustees as well as providing a wide range of 
ancillary services. The associations operate independently of each other. 
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principally with coordinating the affairs of the association, electing members of 
their zone to fill in any board vacancies by shareholders of the company 
involved, educating shareholders in their zones. Each zone keeps a register of 
shareholders in the privatised publicly quoted companies. According to 
Etukudo (2000) „the Association serves the interest of the investing public as 
shareholders who have the opportunity to contribute to the formulation of 
broad corporate policies, thereby enhancing management accountability‟. 
 
At its inception a government parastatal in charge of the privatisation and 
commercialisation programme, the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), 
funded the association from interest earned on deposit of shares pending 
allotment. The association is now funded through a per-capital levy placed on 
quoted companies. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange determine the levy, based on the number of 
shareholders in each company. The fund is collected and administered by the 
Stock Exchange. 
 
Though the association obtains professional guidance from the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, its activities are determined and solely carried out by its members 
in accordance with its constitution. The purpose of the Associations, as 
conceived by the government, is to ensure that Nigerians have representation 
and a voice in the running of the affairs of firms in which they invest. The 
duties of the association according to Etukudo (2000) include:  
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„-- educating and enlightening shareholders on their rights and 
responsibilities;  
-- promoting solidarity among shareholders and stimulating interest in 
the activities of their company;  
-- facilitating representative participation in corporate decision-making 
through regular attendance at annual general meetings as well as 
extra-ordinary general meetings;  
-- nominating their representatives to serve on boards of directors of 
publicly quoted companies;  
-- facilitating easy access to individuals to claim their dividends and 
scrip certificates some of which remain unclaimed due to ignorance of 
their whereabouts. „ 
  
Apart from the government established shareholder associations, there are 
also independent associations of shareholders in Nigeria. These are usually 
regarded as activist associations put together for common causes, by 
individuals with common interests.  The emergence of this private shareholder 
associations shows that Nigerian investors are no longer solely interested in 
the economic value of their shares but also in the right that share ownership 
gives them to influence corporate strategy and management.11 In the last 15 
years at least 30 shareholders association have been established.12 The 
increasing number of these associations has led to recent moves by the 
                                                 
11 Some of the major private Shareholder Association in Nigeria include ‘ Independent Shareholders 
Association of Nigeria, Shareholders Solidarity Association of Nigeria, Nigeria Shareholders Solidarity 
Association, Nigeria Professional Shareholders Association, the Independent Shareholders Association, 
and the Association for the Advancement of Rights of Shareholders.  
12 Sola Ephraim-Oluwanuga ‘Role of Shareholders in Implementing the Code of Corporate Governance’ 
available at http://www.businessdayonline.com  
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Securities and Exchange Commission in Nigeria to regulate the 
associations.13 
 
Okike (2007) has opined that the emergence of these associations have led to 
a rise in shareholder activism in Nigeria. According to her, after analysing 
recent newspaper reports on shareholder associations in the country, 
 
Contrary to the belief that shareholders in Nigeria are ignorant and 
naive, the evidence of actions by the NSSA and other shareholder 
bodies points to the fact that such assumption is antiquated. In Nigeria 
shareholders have been known to challenge the actions of 
management they believe were not taken in their best interest…‟ 
 
It has been reported that shareholder associations have contrary to previous 
practice, rejected yearly account of some companies, opposed appointment of 
certain directors and went to court to some proposed mergers (Okike, 2007).  
A good example of this is the current case between Cadbury and local 
shareholders in Nigeria.14 It is thus obvious that if properly channelled, 
shareholder activism is a potential force for shaping the direction corporate 
decision making takes in the country.  
                                                 
13 See Business Day, June 22nd, 2006 – ‘SEC may review Audit Committee Membership’. However it 
should be noted that in the developed economies block voting through associations have transcended 
the exclusive preserves of volunteers because of the emergence of service firms called ‘proxy providers’, 
which provides institutional investors and companies with large scale voting services. See ‘Improving 
the Exercise of Shareholder Voting Rights at General Meetings in France’ Report of Working Group of 
the Authourite des Marches Financiers (AMF) – France Securities Regulator chaired by Yves Mansion, 
September, 2005 
14 See Tosin Sulaiman ‘Cadbury Nigeria sued by Investors over Accounting’ The Times (March 12, 2007) 
available at 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/consumer_goods/article1499780.ece   
accessed 02/05/07 
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The role of the Internet and the Global System of Mobile Communication 
on Shareholder activities 
 
In addition to the changes in code of corporate governance and formation of 
shareholders associations, two important technological developments have 
helped the bonding together of shareholders for common purposes in Nigeria. 
The growth of the Global System of mobile Communication and the use of the 
Internet has made communication easier and information accessible. Though 
subscription to the Internet is low, but its availability and the availability of 
Internet cafes in all major towns in the country have increased access to 
information. Investors / shareholders now find it easier to access information 
about companies and also to share information with other investors unlike 
before.  Majority of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange now 
have websites and use these to present their annual reports and other 
activities that might be of interest to shareholders. 
 
In addition to company websites, it is now possible to find websites where 
discussions are held on what investments to put money on.15 Furthermore the 
Global System of Communication makes it easier for shareholders to share 
views and discuss issues. In other words, the internet technology and 
                                                 
15 Examples of website where discussions are held include Nairaland – 
http://www.nairaland.com/nigeria owned by a young Nigerian based in Ogun State, Nigeria. Also The 
Nigeria Village Square – www.nigeriavillagesquare.com  
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economy has contributed to empowering shareholders in Nigeria and made 
management much more susceptible to accountability pressures. 
 
Increasing Shareholders participation in Nigeria: any lessons from 
abroad?  
 
Despite the improvements from reformed code of corporate governance, 
formation of shareholders‟ associations and developments in information 
technology, there are still room for improvements. Undoubtedly the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM) is the most viable avenue for shareholders to exert 
their influence. It is therefore important to find ways of increasing shareholders 
participation in AGM. The recent developments regarding shareholder 
associations demonstrates the fact that given the right atmosphere, 
shareholders in Nigeria would likely take active interest in the governance of 
corporations. 
 
Even though the European Union is much more advanced in this area (like in 
many other areas) than Nigeria, there are instructive lessons in developments 
in the EU, which could be adapted suitably to the Nigerian scenario.  While 
the current challenges to shareholders democracy in the EU differ 
considerably from Nigeria and are largely linked to cross border equity 
investments, the steps that have been taken to ameliorate the situation are 
instructive. This is relevant because the steps taken in the EU context were 
also to increase shareholders participation in corporate governance. Under 
the EU 2004 Transparency Directive, timely disclosure of information including 
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place, time and agenda of meetings are required. The directive enables the 
usage of electronic means to pass information to shareholders (Maasen and 
Brown, 2006). Furthermore the Market Abuse Directive in its effect requires 
that companies have Internet sites to which they must post all information that 
they are required to disclose publicly. 
 
There are many advantages to employing modern technologies in this regard. 
It has been observed that in the US where there is a more common use of 
proxy solicitation through Internet and phones, cost is saved at the same time 
a greater quorum is achieved. This is achieved by outsourcing the proxy 
process. According to Maasen and Brown (2006), ADP the largest proxy 
processing company in the US processed more than 153 million proxy pieces 
covering more than 299 billion shares in 2005. A total of 168.2 billion votes 
were cast electronically by phone Internet and Proxy Edge in the year. The 
cost of reaching out to shareholders was reduced by this method by more 
than $ 370 million in 2005 due to savings on postage and paper. 
 
In Nigeria the increase in the use of the Internet and the GSM system could 
provide an avenue for increasing shareholder participation. For examples by 
dedicating a part of companies website to shareholder information, by 
ensuring that shareholders can additionally be contacted through emails and 
the global System for Mobile Communication and by facilitating the processing 
of shareholder‟s questions through these media. Furthermore, in view of the 
epileptic service provided by the postal system in Nigeria and the limitation 
attached to most system of communication in Nigeria due to poor 
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infrastructure it is recommended that the length of notice of meeting be 
increased from 21 days to sixty day and should be published on the website at 
the same time. It is interesting to note that in Europe where there is adequate 
infrastructure there is a pending proposal that notice of general meetings 
should be a minimum of 30 calendar days and should be posted on the 
Internet   at the same time as it is published (Maasen and Brown, 2006). 
 
The EU has proposed that shareholders in the cross border context should 
have the right to ask questions at least in writing ahead of general meetings 
and get responses to their questions. The responses, it is proposed, should 
be made available to all shareholders. This also could be adapted to the 
Nigerian situation by allowing questions to be asked through the post and the 
internet ahead of general meetings. 
 
Conclusion and implications for corporate social responsibility in 
Nigeria 
 
This paper has examined opportunities for shareholder activism within the 
Nigerian corporate governance schema in the light of recent developments. 
Shareholder dominant theories – contract and agency theories – are of the 
view that because of the wide dispersal of shareholding, direct shareholders 
control is hampered, consequently putting into question shareholder 
democracy and activism. Berle and Means (1932) seminal work The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property brought to the fore what has been subject of 
considerable debate in corporate governance for decades thereafter: the 
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separation of ownership from control. Simply put, „shareholders own an entity 
that management runs‟ (Marcus, 2003). However, Berle and Means qualified 
the „ownership‟ status of shareholders as passive owners who had 
surrendered control to management. As Fannon (2003) further expounded, 
the documented attitude of shareholders is to exit when there is dissatisfaction 
with corporations‟ performance rather than attempting to exert influence, as 
true owners of property would do to rectify any shortcoming – a phenomenon 
commonly refer to as rational neutrality or indifference.  The consequence of 
this is that share price becomes the sole indicator of shareholders view in the 
corporate structure. It is thus assumed that the option for any dissatisfied 
shareholders is to sell and leave the corporation. 
 
However, the political model of corporate governance as it interacts with the 
theory of power and cybernetic analysis provides a different perspective 
(Turnbull, 1997). The political model of corporate governance at the micro 
level of the firm has been described as an approach „in which active investors 
seek to change corporate policy by developing voting support from dispersed 
shareholders, rather than by simply purchasing voting power or control…‟ 
(Pound, 1993). This model of governance is based on politics rather finance 
(Pounds, 1993) and recognizes the existence of political market place apart 
from government establishments. According to Turnbull (1993), possession of 
power to act where the knowledge and will to act is present, is an integral part 
of political model of corporate governance. Power relation among 
stakeholders is important because even where there is greater disclosure and 
transparency shareholders must possess both the power and the will to act. 
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This echoes the Focauldian conception of power as power only when it is 
exercised (Kearins, 1996). However power would only be rightly exercised 
where the relevant stakeholder is in possession of accurate information that is 
timely, sufficient and manageable (Turnbull, 1997)  
 
The political model of corporate governance as described above would 
explain the emergence of shareholder activism in its various manifestations in 
recent times. According to O‟Rourke (2003), 
 
„Shareholder groups are increasingly going beyond the decision to 
invest, not to invest, or to divest by proposing and voting on company 
specific corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues at annual 
shareholder meetings. This activity is joined by an increasing 
sophisticated „strategy of engagement‟ by both shareholders and 
companies. In the process, a model of investor capitalism based on 
„responsible ownership‟ is being forged that addresses social and 
environmental issues previously outside the domain of most 
shareholders‟. 
 
The connection between shareholder activism and corporate social 
responsibility is under-emphasised in CSR discourses. Instead, shareholders 
are often presented as „ruthless capitalists‟ who are only driven by profit 
maximisation. However, the emergent and growing interest in social 
responsible investments (SRI) seems to contrast sharply with what has 
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become a conventional misrepresentation of shareholders‟ interest in the 
extant CSR literature. 
 
 In a recent paper on CSR in Nigeria, Amaeshi et al. (2006) found that CSR in 
Nigeria is dominantly understood and practised as corporate philanthropy, 
which is most of the time driven by the whims and caprices of management. In 
this regard, there is a high risk of management pursuing their interests and not 
necessarily those of shareholders (i.e. investors) – thereby feathering own 
nests, reputations and personal aspirations, instead, at the expense of 
shareholders wealth. In addition, Amaeshi et al. concluded that the attraction 
towards corporate philanthropy is driven by the corporate governance 
framework in which these firms are embedded. Whilst not being critical of this 
cultural and institutional bias, this paper argues that there are opportunities in 
the ongoing corporate governance reforms in Nigeria that would give 
individual shareholders voice in moving the firms they invest in beyond 
corporate philanthropy to meeting their strategic objectives and adding real 
value to the Nigerian economy. For instance, shareholders ability to hold 
management to account would encourage management to be more strategic 
in their approach to CSR instead of relying on personal interests and 
aspirations expressed through corporate philanthropy. It is the conclusion of 
this paper that shareholder empowerment in corporate decision making is a 
potential avenue for influencing corporate attitude towards CSR as evidence 
from the US and EU has demonstrated.  
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Appendix 
 
Cadbury Nigeria Plc: An Example of Shareholder’s Failure? 
 
International interests have been attracted to Nigeria recently due to the 
discovery of Enron like Scandal in the subsidiary of Cadbury Schweppes in 
Nigeria: Cadbury Nigeria Plc. Concerns have been raised particularly because 
of the company‟s high profile in the private sector and domestic economy and 
as a major player on the Nigerian Stock exchange. The fact that it took 
Cadbury Schweppes, the parent company‟s intervention to discover the 
irregularities have called into question the capacity of the Nigerian corporate 
governance environment and framework . It must be observed that the 
financial accounts in question were scrutinized and approved by the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange, the Security Exchange Commission and most importantly in 
this connection the shareholders of the company. 
 
Cadbury Nigerian Plc has been listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange since 
1976, and is in the top 10 of the 258 quoted equities by market capitalizations 
as of year end 2003. Cadbury Schweppes until very recently owned 46.3% of 
the equity of the company with the balance stock held by approximately 
51,000 individual and institutional shareholders.16 The company employ more 
than 2000 employees and its sales turnover in 2003 was around US $150 
Million. 
 
                                                 
16 http://cadburynigeria.com/news.php  
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On the 12th of December, 2006 the company released a statement stating 
inter alia 
 
„We are now able to inform all stakeholders of Cadbury Nigeria Plc that 
the independent investigator of our financial statements, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, has submitted a report of their findings. The 
investigation has confirmed a significant and deliberate overstatement 
of the company‟s financial position over a number of years. 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
On account of this, Cadbury Nigeria Plc will report an underlying 
operating loss for 2006 of between N1 and 2 billion. We also expected 
to make one- time exceptional charges in 2006 of between N13 billion 
and N15 billion in respects of the profit and balance sheet 
overstatements, which will considerably diminish company reserves.‟ 
 
Following this incident, the managing director and chief executive officer of the 
company and the financial director were removed and a complete review of 
the company‟s business model was ordered.17  
 
In this connection, investors, including pension fund managers, have since the 
revelation lost a lot of money. Since the exposure of the company‟s 
misrepresentation of their financial statements, the shares of the company 
declined from its high of  N70 on the 18 of August, 2006 to N32.46 – a 
                                                 
17 ibid 
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reduction of 46% - on December, 2006 translating into a loss estimated to be 
in the region of N41.3 billion in shareholders equity. 
 
The state of affair in Nigeria, a country which is striving to gain the confidence 
of investors both foreign and local is further undermining investor‟s confidence 
in the economy. The shareholders are not the only persons who stand to lose 
in this scenario as such developments could lead to job losses in an economy 
dogged by chronic unemployment.  
 
